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Abstract
Research suggests that autistic children can provide accurate and forensically useful eyewitness evidence. However, members 
of a jury also rely on non-verbal behaviours when judging the credibility of a witness, and this could determine the verdict 
of a case. We presented mock jurors with videos (from an experimental study) of one of two child witnesses on the autism 
spectrum being interviewed about a mock minor crime. Results demonstrated that providing jurors with generic information 
about autism and/or informing them of the child’s diagnostic label differentially affected credibility ratings, but not for both 
children. Implications for how to present information about child witnesses with autism to a jury—highlighting the need for 
approaches tailored to individual children—are discussed.
Keywords Autism · Criminal justice · Jury · Credibility · Eyewitness memory
Introduction
Eyewitness evidence can be a key factor in a jury’s decision 
making about a defendant’s guilt or innocence (Nicholson 
et al. 2014); if jurors do not find a witness to be credible, 
they are less likely to decide that the defendant is guilty 
(Pica et al. 2017). In judging the credibility of a witness, 
jurors consider several factors aside from the content of the 
witness’ testimony, including expression of emotion (Cooper 
et al. 2014; Wessel et al. 2013), eye contact (Field et al. 
2010), confidence (Dodson and Dobolyi 2015), and surface 
features of speech (e.g., pause, intonation) (Ozuru and Hirst 
2006). Jurors, therefore, rely on non- and para-verbal behav-
iours, opposed to focusing solely on what the witness has 
said, when making judgements about their credibility.
As autistic1 individuals may be more likely to encoun-
ter the criminal justice system than those without autism 
(e.g., Lindblad and Lainpelto 2011; Turcotte et al. 2017; 
Woodbury-Smith and Dein 2014), it is crucial to assess 
how they are perceived in this context (for example, as wit-
nesses). A growing body of empirical evidence has explored 
the performance of autistic individuals (largely those who 
do not have intellectual disabilities) when giving evidence 
in a criminal justice context. This illustrates how both chil-
dren and adults on the autism spectrum tend to recall less 
information than their typically developing peers when 
free recalling information about an event (e.g., Bruck et al. 
2007; Henry et al. 2017b; Maras et al. 2012; Mattison et al. 
2015; McCrory et al. 2007), but can perform similarly in 
more structured interviews (e.g., Henry et al. 2017a; Maras 
and Bowler 2010), or when additional supports (e.g., more 
specific questioning, physical reinstatement of context, or 
concrete visual prompts) are provided at recall (e.g., Maras 
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1 There is debate regarding the way autism is—and should be—
described. In this article, we use both identity-first language (i.e., 
autistic children) as well as person-first language (i.e., children with 
autism) to respect this diversity of views (see Kenny et al. 2016).
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and Bowler 2012a; Maras et al. 2012; Mattison et al. 2016). 
Research has also highlighted how eyewitness information 
provided by children with autism can be as accurate as that 
of comparable peers (Bruck et al. 2007; Henry et al. 2017a, 
b; McCrory et al. 2007); although it should be noted that 
accuracy levels can vary with interview type (Mattison et al. 
2016) and findings are less consistent in autistic adults (e.g., 
Maras and Bowler 2010; Maras et al. 2012, 2013). Autistic 
children and adults may also display atypicalities in narrat-
ing memories of personally experienced events; for example, 
lacking a consistent high point in their narratives (e.g., Gold-
man 2008; McCabe et al. 2013). Importantly, however, there 
is no evidence supporting the notion that autistic people are 
more suggestible than non-autistic people (Bruck et al. 2007; 
Maras and Bowler 2011, 2012b; McCrory et al. 2007; North 
et al. 2008). This is despite many legal professionals believ-
ing this to be true (see, for example, George et al. 2018, for 
a survey study on this topic in UK barristers).
Although research suggests that autistic witnesses can 
give reliable and accurate eyewitness evidence, individuals 
diagnosed with autism may display atypical behaviours (e.g., 
unusual eye contact, repetitive body movements) that could 
result in their credibility being questioned (McCrory et al. 
2007). This could be particularly relevant if the person’s 
autism diagnosis is not disclosed to the jury. Indeed, many 
witnesses and defendants may be reluctant to share infor-
mation about their autism diagnosis with criminal justice 
processionals, for example, due to concerns about justice 
professionals’ perceived lack of autism of knowledge and 
awareness (e.g., Crane et al. 2016) or fears that their diagno-
sis may count against them (e.g., Cooper and Allely 2017). It 
is, therefore, vital to examine the effects of providing jurors 
with knowledge of a witness’ autism diagnosis, with or with-
out the provision of additional information about the key 
characteristics of autism.
Previous research has shown that providing jurors with 
additional information about witnesses can help address 
unfair biases held about their credibility. This may be par-
ticularly the case for children, who—despite being able to 
provide accurate and forensically useful eyewitness testi-
mony—often find their credibility questioned (e.g., Lamb 
et al. 2011). Goodman-Delahunty et al. (2011), for example, 
found that jurors (in relation to child sexual abuse cases) 
were more likely to convict a defendant if information that 
challenged common misconceptions about children’s mem-
ory was provided by expert witnesses.2 Further, Wadley 
and Haley (2001) found that providing a diagnostic label 
(e.g., Alzheimer’s disease, major depression), in addition 
to information about a person’s condition, allowed others 
to attribute the person’s atypical behaviour to the diagnosis. 
Sasson and Morrison (2017) also reported that while first 
impressions of autistic adults were rated less favourably, 
informing observers of their autism diagnosis resulted in 
significantly more favourable judgements about them. Such 
evidence (that observers can view a person’s behaviours 
more favourably if they know about a diagnosis) supports 
Kelley’s (1971, 1972) discounting principle, in which one 
explanation is diminished when observers are alerted to an 
alternative one.
In this paper, we present a preliminary study of the per-
ceived credibility of child witnesses on the autism spectrum. 
This was achieved by presenting mock jurors with an eco-
logically valid video-recorded interview (as would often 
be presented to jurors in cases involving child witnesses in 
England and Wales, as part of the range of Special Meas-
ures offered to vulnerable witnesses; YJCEA 1999). These 
videos were taken from a larger empirical study on the per-
formance of child witnesses—with and without an autism 
diagnosis—who were interviewed about a staged event that 
they viewed at their school (see Henry et al. 2017a). Mock 
jurors rated videos of one of two autistic child witnesses 
using an 11-item credibility questionnaire, established as 
useful in previous research on child witnesses with and 
without intellectual disabilities (Henry et al. 2011; Peled 
et al. 2004). Prior to completing the questionnaires, we 
manipulated whether mock jurors were made aware of the 
children’s diagnoses, to test Kelley’s (1971, 1972) discount-
ing principle. We also manipulated whether providing jurors 
with additional information about the key characteristics of 
autism (in addition to the diagnostic label) affected cred-
ibility ratings. This is important given that lay people often 
hold clear, but not necessarily accurate, beliefs about autism 
(Gillespie-Lynch et al. 2015; Huws and Jones 2010). Fol-
lowing previous research (e.g., Wadley and Haley 2001), it 
was tentatively predicted that providing information about 
the child’s autism diagnosis together with information about 
autism may improve mock juror’s ratings of the child wit-
nesses’ credibility. However, given the heterogeneity found 
across the autism spectrum, it was also predicted that this 
may be different for each child witness.
Method
Design
We employed a between-subjects design, with mock jurors 
quasi-randomly assigned (based on age and gender) to view 
one of two videos (‘Child A’ or ‘Child B’) and to one of 
three experimental conditions: ‘Told AUT + info’, in which 
mock jurors were told that the child in the video had an 
2 In England and Wales, the term ‘expert witness’ refers to a witness 
who is qualified to provide a statement of opinion to a court on a mat-
ter requiring expertise.
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autism diagnosis and were provided with information about 
the key characteristics of autism (see “Appendix”); ‘Told 
AUT + no info’, in which mock jurors were told that the child 
had an autism diagnosis but were not provided with fur-
ther information about autism; or ‘Not told AUT + no info’, 
in which mock jurors were not told that the child had an 
autism diagnosis, nor were they given any information about 
autism. The dependent variables were 11 credibility char-
acteristics on which the mock jurors rated the child (from 
Henry et al. 2011; Peled et al. 2004).
Participants
An opportunity sample of 120 mock jurors participated 
in this study, all of whom confirmed their eligibility for 
jury service in the United Kingdom: the jurors were aged 
18–69, were not lacking capacity within the meaning of 
the Mental Capacity Act (Department of Health 2005), and 
were not recently serving criminal convictions. Half of the 
jurors (n = 60) watched Child A’s video, and the other half 
(n = 60) watched Child B’s video. Within each group, 20 
jurors were assigned to the ‘Told AUT + info’ condition, 20 
were assigned to the ‘Told AUT + no info’ condition, and 
20 were assigned to the ‘Not told AUT + no info’ condition. 
Mock juror demographics are presented in Table 1, along 
with ratings of their prior knowledge/experience of autism.
Materials
Witness Videos
As part of a larger study on the eyewitness capabilities of 
child witnesses with and without an autism diagnosis (see 
Henry et al. 2017a), 18 children on the autism spectrum 
received a ‘Best-Practice’ police interview, conducted in line 
with Achieving Best Evidence (Home Office 2011) guide-
lines. From this sample, we selected two videos to show to 
a sample of mock jurors. These videos were selected as they 
were of good audio and visual quality, and because their 
parents had provided consent for the videos to be used in a 
juror perception study (note: no other videos from the larger 
study were available for this purpose).
The two videos each depicted boys sitting alongside the 
same interviewer (a postdoctoral research associate who had 
completed a 1-week Investigative Interviewing Victim and 
Witnesses Training Course provided by the UK’s Metropoli-
tan Police Service). 1 week prior to the interview, both boys 
had watched a video of a staged event involving two men 
giving a talk about what school was like a long time ago. The 
talk had educational content but also involved a minor mock 
crime (the theft of a phone). As well as receiving an immedi-
ate, brief interview about what they saw (which took place 
on the same day; see Henry et al. 2017b, for details), the 
children took part in a full investigative interview approxi-
mately 1 week later conducted according to best-practice 
police guidelines currently used in England and Wales (see 
Henry et al. 2017a). This latter full investigative interview 
was shown to the mock jurors as part of the current study 
(as would happen in a real case). It comprised three distinct 
phases.
The first phase comprised ‘rapport building’, in which 
the interviewer asked the child some neutral questions 
not related to the staged event, designed to elicit positive 
answers and set a good tone for the subsequent interview. 
For Child A, this involved a conversation about what the 
child did on the weekend (his birthday party); and for Child 
B, a conversation about what the child had for lunch, and 
what he was planning to do after school on that day (going 
to the park). Phase two comprised a ‘truth and lies exer-
cise’, in which the interviewer used a scenario to determine 
whether the child could tell the difference between truth and 
lies (e.g., the interviewer pointed to a blue door and said 
to the child: ‘That door is bright red. Is that the truth or a 
lie?’). Both children were able to respond accurately to the 
truth and lies question (they confirmed that the interviewer 
had told a lie and provided the correct answer). The inter-
viewer concluded this portion of the interview by explaining 
to the child that it was important that they tell the truth and 
not make anything up, and that it was fine to say that they 
did not know the answer to a question. Phase three com-
prised the ‘investigative interview’, in which the interviewer 
questioned the child about what they saw using Achieving 
Table 1  Mock juror 
demographics (n = 120) Video Condition N Mean age (SD) Gender (M:F) Mean (SD) prior knowledge/experience of autism (max = 7)
Child A Told AUT + info 20 43.70 (13.87) 10:10 3.70 (1.30)
Told AUT + no info 20 43.80 (15.54) 10:10 4.05 (1.67)
Not told AUT + no info 20 44.95 (14.52) 10:10 3.40 (1.50)
Child B Told AUT + info 20 43.50 (14.89) 10:10 3.60 (1.19)
Told AUT + no info 20 43.80 (14.71) 10:10 3.10 (1.37)
Not told AUT + no info 20 43.53 (14.79) 10:10 3.25 (1.37)
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Best Evidence (Home Office 2011) principles; guidelines 
used for investigative interviewing in England and Wales. 
Specifically, the interviewer elicited a free recall account 
from the child by stating: ‘Tell me what you remember about 
what you saw’. The interviewer then asked open questions 
based upon what the child had said in their free recall. Given 
that the nature and content of the questioning depended on 
the information the child provided during their free recall, 
‘prompts’ from the interviewer were individually tailored 
for each child, but both children were prompted a similar 
number of times (Child A = 16 times; Child B = 18 times).3
Interview Performance of Each Child Witness
In the investigative interview, both children recalled key 
aspects of the staged event: (1) that it involved two men, 
who they could briefly describe; (2) that it involved content 
related to Victorian times; and (3) that there was an issue 
regarding a phone. Child A recalled the event in somewhat 
more detail than Child B. For example, whilst Child B sim-
ply stated that “one [man] left their phone behind”, Child 
A recalled significantly more about the phone (“one man 
said ‘make sure no one takes my phone’ then the other man 
took his phone… he put his phone on the chair and not the 
floor… and he took it thinking it was his phone”). Indeed, 
calculating the total amount of details recalled (as per Henry 
et al. 2017a, b), Child A recalled 43 details, whilst Child 
B recalled 27 details. Importantly, these figures represent 
the total amount of information the children provided, irre-
spective of its accuracy. This is because jurors do not know 
whether information recalled is correct or incorrect [Accu-
racy rates were: Child A (76.74%) and Child B (85.18%)—
with both showing fairly high percentage accuracy rates]. 
Child A’s interview lasted 10 min 16 s (3 min 20 s for rap-
port building, 30 s for truth and lies, 6 min 26 s for the 
investigative interview) and Child B’s interview lasted 6 min 
44 s (1 min 13 s for rapport building, 42 s for truth and lies, 
4 min 49 s for the investigative interview).
Cognitive Characteristics of Each Child Witness
The children were both boys, of a similar age. They were 
also of similar (average) cognitive ability (as measured using 
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, WASI-II, 
Wechsler and Zhou 2011) and receptive language ability (as 
measured using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale, BPVS-
III, Dunn et al. 2009). Child A, however, had higher scores 
on some expressive language measures: subtests of the 
Expressive Language Test (ELT-2, Bowers et al. 2010) and 
the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals (CELF-
4, Semel et al. 2006). The characteristics of the children are 
presented in Table 2.
Behavioural Characteristics of Each Child Witness
To further explore the characteristics of the children in the 
videos, we asked 24 lay people to rate the videos on a series 
of behavioural characteristics, all on a series of 7-point Lik-
ert scales (from 1 = not at all, to 7 = very much). As can be 
seen in Table 3, this revealed that Child A was rated as sig-
nificantly more monotonous than the Child B, while Child 
B was rated as significantly less composed, coherent, and 
focused than Child A, and also as showing significantly less 
appropriate use of vocabulary.
Procedure for Mock Jurors
Prior to viewing the videos, the mock jurors in the ‘Told 
AUT + info’ condition were informed that the child had an 
autism diagnosis and were also asked to read some informa-
tion detailing the key features and characteristics of the con-
dition (see “Appendix”); mock jurors in the ‘Told AUT + no 
info’ condition were informed that the child in the video 
had an autism diagnosis, but were not given any additional 
information about autism; and mock jurors in the ‘Not told 
AUT + no info’ condition were not given any information 
about the child’s diagnosis. It was explained to the jurors 
that the video that they were about to view comprised three 
distinct phases: rapport, truth and lies and the main investi-
gative interview.
Table 2  Characteristics of the two child witnesses
a T-scores (mean 50, SD 10)
b Standardised scores (mean 100, SD 15)
c Scaled scores (mean 10, SD 3)
Child A Child B
Age 9 years 11 months 10 years 9 months
WASI-II verbal  IQa 53 56
WASI-II non-verbal  IQa 46 43
WASI-II full-scale  IQ2 99 99
BPVS-IIIb 92 89
ELT-2  sequencingb 113 114
ELT-2 grammar and  syntaxb 111 92
CELF-4 recalling  sentencesc 11 9
CELF-4 formulated 
 sentencesc
12 5
3 These prompts comprised a mixture of ‘reiterations’ (e.g., “you said 
they got their maths wrong…”; five such prompts for Child A and 
nine for Child B), ‘requests for additional information’ (e.g., “tell me 
more about that”; five such requests for Child A and seven for Child 
B), and ‘clarifications’ (e.g., Child: ‘the shoe looks like this [points], 
Interviewer: ‘ok –like black trainers?’; six such requests for Child A 
and two for Child B).
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After watching one of the videos (of Child A or Child B), 
participants completed a pen and paper credibility question-
naire, which asked them to rate the following aspects of the 
witness’ credibility on 11 7-point Likert scales (from 1 = not 
at all, to 7 = very much): accuracy; convincingness; confi-
dence in what was said; confidence in demeanour; compe-
tence; honesty; believability; completeness of account; level 
of cognitive functioning; capability to testify; and overall 
performance (adapted from Henry et al. 2011; Peled et al. 
2004).
At the end of the study, after participants had been 
debriefed about the aims of the research, those who were 
not informed of the child’s diagnosis were asked whether 
they had guessed the child in the video was diagnosed with 
autism. For Child A, none of the 20 mock jurors in the ‘Not 
told AUT + no info’ condition guessed that the child was on 
the autism spectrum, and for Child B, three of the 20 jurors 
guessed the child’s diagnosis. There was no significant dif-
ference in the likelihood of the jurors guessing the child’s 
diagnosis as a function of whether they viewed Child A or 
Child B’s video, χ2(1) = 0.07, p = .23. Participants were 
also asked how much knowledge and experience they had 
of autism, prior to taking part in this research, rated on a 
7-point Likert scale from 1 (no knowledge/experience) to 
7 (very knowledgeable/experienced) (see Table 1). One 
way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) revealed no signifi-
cant differences in mock jurors’ knowledge/experience of 
autism as a function of Condition (‘Told AUT + info’, ‘Told 
AUT + no info’, ‘Not told AUT + no info’) either for those 
who viewed the video of Child A, F(2, 57) = 0.94, p = .39, 
ηp2 = 0.03, or Child B, F(2, 57) = 0.76, p = .47, ηp2 = 0.03. 
Further, there was no significant difference in knowledge/
experience of autism between those who viewed the video of 
Child A (mean = 3.72, SD = 1.50) or Child B (mean = 3.32, 
SD = 1.31), F(1, 118) = 2.43, p = .12, ηp2 = 0.02.
Ethical approval was obtained from the Research Eth-
ics Committee at the university at which the research was 
conducted.
Results
Mean scores for the 11 credibility questions answered by 
mock jurors (in each of the three conditions) in relation to 
the video that they watched (Child A or Child B) are given 
in Table 4.
Prior to exploring the effect of providing jurors with 
information about autism and/or the child’s diagnostic label, 
a principle component analysis (PCA) using Oblimin rota-
tion was conducted on the 11 credibility ratings (to reduce 
the dimensionality and noise in the data). The Kaiser-Mayer-
Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analy-
sis, KMO = 0.92, and KMO values for all individual items 
were > 0.8; well above the acceptable limit of 0.5 (Field 
et al. 2010). Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ2 (55) = 1157.28, 
p < .001, indicated that correlations between items were suf-
ficiently large for PCA. An initial analysis was run to obtain 
eigenvalues for each component in the data. One component 
had an eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and explained 
67.2% of the variance. The scree plot showed an inflection 
that would justify retaining component 1 (see Table 5 for 
factor loadings). All 11 items clustered on the same com-
ponent, suggesting that component 1 represented ‘overall 
credibility’. This component was used as a dependent vari-
able for subsequent analyses.4
To explore mock jurors’ perceptions of the witness’ cred-
ibility, two one-way between participants ANOVAs were 
used (one for each child) with Condition (‘Told AUT + info’, 
‘Told AUT + no info’, ‘Not told AUT + no info’) as the 
independent variable and the ‘overall credibility’ compo-
nent (extracted from the PCA) as the dependent variable. 
There was no significant effect of Condition for Child A, 
F(2, 57) = 2.55, p = .09, ηp2 = 0.08, although Condition was 
Table 3  Lay person ratings of 
behavioural characteristics for 
the child witnesses
Child A Child B Differences
How repetitive the child’s account was 3.70 (1.74) 2.96 (1.52) t(46) = 1.61, p = .11
How monotonous the child’s tone of voice was 5.39 (1.53) 3.29 (1.33) t(46) = 4.94, p < .001
How composed the child appeared 5.48 (1.24) 3.29 (1.30) t(46) = 5.96, p < .001
How appropriate the vocabulary the child used was 5.61 (1.16) 4.79 (1.35) t(46) = 2.19, p = .03
How coherent the child’s speech was 5.09 (1.28) 4.08 (1.41) t(46) = 2.60, p = .01
How clear the child’s speech was 4.57 (1.53) 4.83 (1.37) t(46) = − 0.50, p = .62
How natural the child’s facial expression was 5.09 (1.47) 4.75 (1.42) t(46) = 0.81, p = .42
How natural the child’s body language was 4.87 (1.58) 4.17 (1.68) t(46) = 1.43, p = .16
How natural the child’s eye contact was 4.61 (1.37) 4.17 (1.43) t(46) = 1.14, p = .26
How natural the child’s gestures were 4.65 (1.56) 3.83 (1.46) t(46) = 1.93, p = .06
How focused the child was 5.43 (1.47) 3.46 (1.32) t(46) = 4.85, p < .001
4 Note that all analyses were also run with the mean score across all 
11 credibility items (opposed to the ‘overall credibility’ component 
derived from the PCA) and the results remained the same.
 Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
1 3
significant for Child B, F(2, 57) = 4.18, p = .02, ηp2 = 0.13. 
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc t tests revealed that Child B 
was judged as more credible in ‘Told AUT + info’ condition 
relative to the ‘Not told AUT + no info’ condition (p = .02), 
Table 4  Mean overall credibility ratings (on a 7-point Likert scale) for the children across the three conditions (Told AUT + info, Told AUT + no 
info, and Not told AUT + no info) (n = 120)
Child A Child B
Told AUT + info Told AUT + no info Not told AUT + no 
info
Told AUT + info Told AUT + no info Not told AUT + no 
info
n = 20 n = 20 n = 20 n = 20 n = 20 n = 20
Mean credibility 
score (across all 
11 items)
4.45 (1.01) 5.10 (0.78) 4.51 (1.20) 4.55 (0.92) 3.86 (0.90) 3.68 (1.17)
How convincing 
was the child?
4.60 (1.43) 5.25 (0.85) 4.70 (1.62) 4.45 (1.10) 3.75 (1.21) 3.75 (1.25)
How confident was 
the child in what 
they said?
4.45 (1.47) 5.05 (1.19) 4.05 (1.57) 4.45 (1.15) 3.80 (1.28) 3.70 (1.52)
How confident was 
the child in their 
demeanour?
3.90 (1.02) 4.25 (1.07) 3.45 (1.54) 4.20 (1.28) 3.65 (1.27) 3.45 (1.43)
How competent was 
the child?
4.35 (0.87) 5.05 (1.19) 4.35 (1.09) 4.45 (0.94) 3.90 (1.07) 3.55 (1.28)
How honest was the 
child?
5.20 (1.24) 6.10 (1.02) 5.50 (1.15) 5.75 (1.02) 5.05 (1.19) 4.45 (1.19)
How believable was 
the child?
4.95 (1.32) 5.50 (0.89) 4.90 (1.48) 4.70 (0.92) 4.10 (1.21) 3.95 (1.47)
How complete 
was the child’s 
account?
4.10 (1.74) 4.50 (1.28) 4.00 (1.49) 3.75 (0.97) 3.00 (0.79) 3.20 (1.44)
What was the 
child’s overall 
level of cognitive 
functioning?
4.60 (1.54) 4.90 (1.25) 4.70 (1.49) 4.40 (1.09) 3.80 (0.83) 3.75 (1.48)
What was the 
child’s capability 
to testify?
4.30 (1.52) 5.15 (1.31) 4.60 (1.63) 4.45 (1.32) 3.70 (1.30) 3.50 (1.39)
How good was this 
child overall?
4.15 (1.50) 5.20 (1.20) 4.60 (1.50) 4.50 (1.28) 3.65 (1.27) 3.50 (1.36)
Table 5  Principal components 
analysis loadings (n = 120) Factor loadings
Overall credibility
What was the child’s capability to testify? 0.88
How good was the child overall? 0.88
What was the child’s overall level of cognitive function? 0.85
How accurate was the child? 0.84
How believable was the child? 0.84
How convincing was the child? 0.84
How competent was the child? 0.83
How complete was the child’s account? 0.82
How confident was the child in what they said? 0.80
How honest was the child? 0.75
How confident was the child in their demeanour? 0.65
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with all other comparisons between conditions non-signif-
icant (ps > .05).
Next, bivariate correlations were used to explore the rela-
tionship between mock jurors’ credibility ratings and their 
knowledge/experience of autism. These revealed that there 
was a significant positive relationship between scores on the 
‘overall credibility’ component (extracted from the PCA) 
and mock jurors’ ratings of prior knowledge/experience of 
autism for those who viewed the video of Child B (r = .34, 
p < .05), but not for those who viewed the video of Child A 
(r = − .01, p = .93).
Discussion
This preliminary study examined how mock jurors perceived 
the credibility of two child witnesses on the autism spec-
trum and examined whether informing mock jurors about 
the child’s autism diagnosis (with or without the provision of 
additional information about autism) affected mock jurors’ 
credibility ratings. Results demonstrated that mock jurors’ 
credibility ratings were, to an extent (i.e., for only one child 
witness), influenced by the provision of the child’s diagnos-
tic label and information about autism. Specifically, ratings 
of credibility were lower for Child B if no autism label or 
autism information had been provided, relative to both being 
provided. However, this was not the case for Child A (cred-
ibility ratings did not vary with the provision of information 
about autism or the child’s diagnostic label). It is important 
to consider why the results might differ for these two child 
witnesses on the autism spectrum.
One potential reason relates to the level of detail provided 
by each child during their investigative interview. Previous 
juror perception studies (e.g., Henry et al. 2011) have shown 
that witnesses who recall more information about an event 
are perceived to be more credible. Consistent with this sug-
gestion, Child A (who was judged to be more credible on 
many items rated by mock jurors) recalled more details at 
interview (43) than Child B (27). Hence, there may have 
been less need to use Kelley’s (1971, 1972) ‘discounting 
principle’ (that one explanation is diminished when observ-
ers are alerted to an alternative one) with Child A because 
his account was fuller and, possibly for this reason, more 
convincing. Importantly, for witnesses diagnosed with 
autism, a growing body of research has demonstrated that 
autistic children often recall less information than their non-
autistic peers, largely during free recall (e.g., Bruck et al. 
2007; Henry et al. 2017b; Mattison et al. 2015; McCrory 
et al. 2007). Whilst this is not always apparent during more 
structured questioning (e.g., Henry et al. 2017a), there is still 
significant variability in the amount that children (including 
those on the autism spectrum) recall: some individuals pro-
vide detailed and extensive accounts, whereas others provide 
sparser reports, even with more structured questioning (cf. 
Henry et al. 2017a). It is particularly important for jurors to 
be made aware of this prior to evaluating an autistic child’s 
testimony, since media representations of people on the 
autism spectrum commonly emphasise prodigious memory 
skills, potentially raising expectations of autistic people’s 
abilities to an unrealistically high level (Draaisma 2009).
The two children in the videos may also have differed in 
other important ways that had a bearing on mock juror cred-
ibility ratings. Whilst similar in age, gender, IQ, and recep-
tive language, the two children may have differed in their 
manifestation of autism (i.e., the way in which their behav-
iours appeared to mock jurors). A key feature of autism is 
that different individuals display different behaviours and to 
different degrees (as emphasised in the information given to 
jurors in the ‘Told AUT + info’ condition); thus, it was not 
surprising that the two autistic children who featured in this 
study varied in their behaviour and demeanour. Our sample 
of 24 lay people who rated the videos on a series of behav-
ioural characteristics highlighted several differences. While 
Child A was rated as significantly more monotonous than the 
Child B, Child B was rated as significantly less composed, 
coherent, and focused than Child A, whilst also being rated 
as showing significantly less appropriate use of vocabulary 
(the latter observation being in line with the poorer expres-
sive language scores for Child B relative to Child A, on 
standardised tests). Again, Kelley’s (1971, 1972) discounting 
principle may only have applied to Child B, who displayed 
atypical behavioural characteristics possibly associated with 
autism (i.e., being less focused, composed, coherent). This 
might link to our mock jurors’ ratings of their knowledge/
experience of autism, which correlated with credibility rat-
ings for Child B but not Child A. These findings suggest 
that knowledge/experience of autism may affect credibility 
judgements only when the child is displaying more atypical 
behavioural characteristics, which has implications for chil-
dren who may not match the stereotypical view of an autistic 
child, such as some girls on the autism spectrum (Gould and 
Ashton-Smith 2011), an important area that warrants further 
investigation.
Overall, the results of this preliminary study highlight 
how care must be exerted regarding how information about 
autism is presented to juries. We suggest that, rather than 
providing generic information about autism, information 
specific to each autistic child should be presented; explic-
itly outlining how their autism manifests and how it might 
impact on their testimony (if at all). Surveys have high-
lighted how legal professionals (e.g., police officers, bar-
risters), even with fairly good knowledge of the key charac-
teristics of autism, often lack confidence in their abilities to 
make accommodations and adjustments to meet the needs 
of autistic witnesses and defendants (George et al. 2018; 
Maras et al. 2017). As such, they may be unsure how to 
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present information about autism to a jury. In England and 
Wales, the Registered Intermediary (RI) role has been intro-
duced; initially as a pilot scheme (in 2004) before being 
rolled out more widely in 2009 (Cooper 2016; Cooper and 
Wurtzel 2014; Plotnikoff and Woolfson 2015). RIs are 
impartial, trained professionals who facilitate communi-
cation between vulnerable witnesses5 and criminal justice 
professionals. RIs are individually ‘matched’ to vulnerable 
witnesses based on the expertise of the RI and the needs of 
the witness (as such, an autistic child will likely be matched 
to an RI with expertise in both autism and working with 
child witnesses). As part of their wide-ranging role, the RI 
will conduct detailed assessments of the vulnerable witness, 
to identify how to facilitate fair and appropriate access to 
justice for that specific individual. An RI would, therefore, 
be in an excellent position to prepare individualised informa-
tion about a witness for a jury, which the current research 
suggests is urgently needed. There is growing international 
interest in implementing RI schemes outside of England and 
Wales (Cooper and Mattison 2017; Plotnikoff and Woolf-
son 2015), with schemes being successfully implemented 
in other jurisdictions (Cooper 2016; Cooper and Wurtzel 
2014). Until such a procedure exists in other countries, 
expert witnesses (or similar) may be able to provide such 
information to juries, in collaboration with the vulnerable 
individual (if possible) and those who know them well (e.g., 
family members, teachers, support workers).
Finally, it is important to highlight the strengths and 
limitations of this research. Most juror perception research 
uses transcripts of evidential interviews (e.g., Henry et al. 
2011), enabling a high degree of experimental control but 
lacking real-world applicability. The current study presented 
ecologically valid video-recorded interviews, as would be 
presented to jurors in a real case. Yet this does come at a 
cost—whilst the results showed how credibility ratings 
differed for each child depending on the information pro-
vided to jurors, it was unclear exactly why these differences 
occurred. Within the constraints of this preliminary study, it 
was not possible to provide an objective measure of the chil-
dren’s levels of autistic traits, nor explore precisely which 
aspects of the children’s testimony might have affected cred-
ibility ratings (e.g., by interviewing mock jurors about their 
rationale for their credibility judgements). It is important 
that future research (using a wider range of child witnesses) 
examines this more systematically.
Further, the videos shown to mock jurors were taken from 
an experimental study in which the children had viewed a 
video of a mild mock theft (as observers, rather than as 
active participants). In real-life, undertaking an investigative 
interview with a police officer (potentially about a serious 
or emotionally upsetting event) could cause high levels of 
anxiety and stress for a witness. This may be especially true 
of children on the autism spectrum, with one review suggest-
ing that between 11 and 84% of autistic children experience 
impairing anxiety to some degree (White et al. 2009). This 
could affect how the child presents during interview, which 
may affect juror perceptions of credibility. Future work 
should, if possible, explore how jurors rate the credibility 
of autistic child witnesses in real-life evidential interviews.
Conclusion
This preliminary study demonstrated that providing mock 
jurors with a child’s diagnostic label and informing them 
of generic information about autism affected credibility rat-
ings, but not for both of the autistic children included. We 
tentatively suggest that differences occurred in credibility 
ratings for one child and not the other due to factors such as 
the amount of information recalled or the overtness of the 
children’s behavioural atypicalities. Hence, caution should 
be exercised when providing jurors with information about 
a child’s diagnostic label and autism more generally, and 
any information provided to jurors should be tailored to the 
specific profile of the child. It is crucial for criminal justice 
professionals to consider—on an individual basis—how best 
to present information about child witnesses to a jury, espe-
cially in relation to those on the autism spectrum. It will also 
be important for future work to include adult witnesses on 
the autism spectrum, to explore the impact of age on judge-
ments of witness credibility.
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Appendix: Instructions Provided 
to Participants in the AUT + info Condition
What is Autism?
Autism is a developmental condition that affects how a 
person communicates with, and relates to, other people. 
For example, children with autism may not understand the 
unwritten social rules that children without the condition 
inherently pick up on.
Some of the behavioural features of autism often 
include:
• Idiosyncratic speech and odd intonations: For example, 
a child with autism’s speech might be particularly flat 
or ‘monotone’. It may also be high-pitched, or have 
unusual rhythm and loudness.
• Literality: Children with autism can be very literal in 
what they say and can have difficulty understanding 
jokes, metaphor and sarcasm. For example, “that’s 
cool” might be taken to mean that it is cold.
• Facial expressions and gestures: Children with autism 
may use unusual, or a limited range of, facial expres-
sions. They can find it difficult to use expressive ges-
tures appropriately and to convey the meaning of what 
they are saying.
• Topics of conversation: Children with autism some-
times go off-topic in their story telling, and find it dif-
ficult to tell their story according to the listener’s needs.
• Repetitive, nervous and ‘stimmming’ behaviours: 
Children with autism often show unusual movements, 
which might include rocking, hand flapping, finger 
flicking, twitchy and repetitive movements.
• Inappropriate eye contact: Children with autism some-
times make unusual eye contact, or avoid making eye 
contact altogether.
Importantly, autism is a spectrum condition. This means 
that, while people with autism share certain difficulties, 
they are affected by it in different ways and not all children 
with autism will display the behaviours just described, or 
to the same degree. It is often referred to as a ‘hidden’ 
disability, because it is not always obvious that a person 
has an autism diagnosis.
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